criminal procedure decisions of the Warren Court. The names of many of those decisions are well known, among them Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961 ), Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964 ), and, of course, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966 .
These Were the doctrinal pillars of the Warren Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence. The Burger Court overruled none of these decisions. Indeed, in recent years Miranda has become a household term, though members of the public probably use it with less than full understanding.
Perhaps you have heard the story of the woman whose son was a professor of law and who occasionally commented to him about the law. After Ernesto Miranda was killed in a barroom brawl over a card game, the mother sent her son a copy of the newspaper clipping concerning Miranda's death. On the bottom she wrote: "Charles, after all he did for us, isn't this a shame!" Whatever one's view of Miranda, the decision has a symbolic quality that extends far beyond its practical impact upon police interrogation methods.
It is fair to say that some decisions of the Burger Court have limited Miranda. In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971) , for example, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that statements inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief because of defective Miranda warnings nevertheless could be used to impeach the defendant's credibility if he chose to take the stand. More recently, in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) , the Court recognized a narrow public safety exception to the Miranda rule. In that case, officers arrested a suspect in a crowded supermarket. When an officer noticed that the suspect wore an empty shoulder holster, he asked the suspect, without first giving Miranda warnings, where he had hidden the gun. We held that the suspect's response and the gun were admissible in evidence because the need to protect the public safety outweighed the need for Miranda warnings.
The Burger Court also was called upon to define the terms used in the Miranda standard and thus to clarify the extent of the protections the decision afforded. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) , for example, the Court defined the meaning of "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda, holding that warnings are required "whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." Id. at 300-01. While that legal definition appears fairly generous, the Court went on to apply it cautiously, concluding that the respondent in Innis had not been "interrogated." Similarly, the Burger Court provided a test for deciding when a suspect is "in custody" for Miranda purposes. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) 
, however, the Court did place an outer limit on the Massiah rule, requiring a defendant to show that the police took some action, beyond merely listening, to elicit his incriminating remarks.
The Warren Court also is well known for its Fourth Amendment decisions. One of the most famous of these, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) , held that the exclusionary rule was applicable in state criminal trials. The Burger Court has continued stringently to enforce the rights of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. But we have qualified some of the Warren Court's broad statements concerning the scope of the remedy for violation of Fourth Amendment rights.
Most importantly perhaps, the Burger Court rejected language in Mapp that suggested the use of illegally seized evidence was itself a Fourth Amendment violation. We explained that the exclusionary rule was a "judicially created means of effectuating" Fourth Amendment rights that rested "principally on the belief that exclusion would deter future unlawful police conduct. " Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 484 (1976) . Based on that view of the exclusionary rule, the Burger Court significantly modified the rule when, in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) , we adopted the so-called "good faith" exception.
The Burger Court inherited criminal procedure decisions announcing broad principles protecting the rights of criminal defendants.
2 In reviewing 1. Just this term, the Court extended the rule in Edwards, holding that its protection applies once a suspect invokes his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during his arraignment. Michigan v. Jackson, -U.S. - (1986) . 2. Capital punishment jurisprudence was one area that was virtually undeveloped by the Warren Court, with that Court implicitly accepting the view that imposition of the death penalty was consistent with the Constitution. Indeed, in an opinion written for himself and three other Justices, Chief Justice Warren expressed the view that the death penalty could not "be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty" because the penalty had been employed throughout our Nation's history and was still accepted by our society. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) . In 1972, however, the Burger Court took the significant step of deciding that capital punishment, as then implemented by the States, offended the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972 (1968) , which held that federal courts could, in appropriate cases, order affirmative action to achieve desegregated public schools.
The Burger Court has not retreated from these decisions. Indeed, in 430 (1980) . The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that imposition of the penalty is constitutional only if States scrupulously follow standards that protect against its arbitrary imposition. In two important capital punishment cases decided this term, we concluded that the Eighth Amendment bars execution of a prisoner who is insane, Ford v. Wainwright, -U.S. -(1986), but upheld the States' practice of excluding from the jury that will decide guilt persons with scruples against the death penalty, Lockhart v. McCree, __ U.S. -(1986). 3. Habeas corpus jurisprudence is another area in which the Burger Court inherited a legacy of broad decisions favoring the rights of criminal defendants. The Burger Court clearly has narrowed some of those decisions. Fairly read, the Burger Court's decisions represent an effort to accommodate the States' interest in finality of criminal convictions, on which many important aspects of a rational criminal justice system are founded, with a prisoner's interest in relief from unjust incarceration. For example, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) , we removed Fourth Amendment claims from the reach of the federal habeas statutes because of the costs imposed on the administration of criminal justice by application of the exclusionary rule on collateral review. We concluded that federal courts no longer should accept habeas jurisdiction over search and seizure claims unless the prisoner could show that the State had denied him a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim. (1973) .
Perhaps the most difficult issues in this area arise in "affirmative action" or "reverse discrimination" cases. The Warren Court never confronted this issue. We squarely faced it for the first time in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) . There, the University's system for admission to its Medical School used a quota, reserving 16 of 100 seats for minority students. The parties conceded that the respondent Bakke, whose application for admission was rejected, had better grades and test scores than most of the minority students admitted. Since diversity of experience and background, including race, was desirable in the educational setting, we concluded that a university lawfully could consider race as a factor in its admissions system. But we disapproved fixed quotas based on race alone such as that used by the University in Bakke.
Two years after Bakke, we considered an affirmative action program, expressly approved by Congress, for choosing contractors for Federal work projects. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) . We upheld the plan, although there was no Court for the appropriate standard to be used to assess the constitutionality of affirmative action.
This past term, we decided three difficult affirmative action cases. The first, Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, -U.S. _ (1986), was brought by nonminority teachers to challenge their school board's layoff system, under which nonminority teachers would be discharged while minority teachers with less seniority would be retained. The board sought to justify the system on the ground that it alleviated the effects of societal discrimination by providing role models for minority students. But there had been no finding of prior employment discrimination on the part of the school board. We therefore concluded that the racial classification embodied in the layoff provision violated equal protection.
In two cases involving discrimination by local unions, we considered whether Title VII empowers federal courts to order race-conscious relief that benefits persons who were not actual victims of discrimination. 
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difficult to identify such a standard because these cases present a wide variety of circumstances, and raise issues under both the Equal Protection Clause and civil rights statutes. It is to be hoped that the day will soon come when race and ancestry are factors no longer taken into account in either private or governmental decision-making.
I mention one additional race discrimination case decided this term. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965) , the Warren Court effectively permitted prosecutors to use peremptory challenges to strike prospective black jurors on account of their race. This term, in Batson v. Kentucky, __ U.S. __ (1986), we overruled Swain and held that such a use of peremptory challenges violates a black defendant's right to equal protection. Now, where the prosecutor's action in striking blacks gives rise to an inference of discrimination, he must articulate a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for his use of peremptory challenges. In this case, the Burger Court went well beyond the Warren Court in expanding protections afforded to minorities in a criminal trial.
Sex Discrimination
Although it had few opportunities to consider the issue, the Warren Court seemed almost uninterested in sex discrimination. For a century, the Supreme Court had refused to overturn the line that States traditionally drew between the sexes, upholding statutes barring women from jury service and from certain occupations. In Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), the Warren Court reaffirmed that States largely were free to exclude women from jury service.
By contrast, the Burger Court repeatedly has removed barriers to equality among the sexes. While there have been many important decisions in this area, I mention only a few.
The earliest was Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) , that invalidated, under the Equal Protection Clause, an Idaho statute that gave a mandatory preference to male applicants for letters of administration of a decedent's estate. Although Chief Justice Burger's opinion for a unanimous Court was brief, it was recognized as a turning point in our equal protection jurisprudence.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) , marked the beginning of the Burger Court's efforts to decide what level of equal protection scrutiny should be applied to legislative classifications based on sex. A plurality argued that such classifications should be held inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Four other Justices concurred in the judgment, declining to adopt that view of the applicable standard. But eight members of the Court agreed that the Equal Protection Clause required that married women in the armed services be provided fringe benefits identical to those given to married men.
The Burger Court also effectively overruled the Warren Court's holding that a state lawfully could exclude women from jury service. S. 718 (1982) , presented a reverse sex discrimination situation. In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that a state-supported professional nursing school could not lawfully exclude men even though seven other state universities were coeducational, with two of those seven schools providing the very curriculum that the respondent sought to pursue. This decision took the important step of clearly articulating a standard applicable to gender-based classifications. The Court held that a government attempting to support such a classification has the heavy "burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification," that is satisfied by showing that the "classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.' "458 U.S. at 724 (citations omitted). 4 Finally, in a case decided this term, we held that allegations of "hostile environment" sexual harassment state an actionable sex discrimination claim under Title VII. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, -U.S. - (1986) . The Court unanimously agreed on the result in this case.
Substantive Due Process
The most controversial decision of the Burger Court is Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) , that invalidated on substantive due process grounds state laws that criminalized most abortions. Roe v. Wade and its progeny recognize a right of privacy, "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty," that encompasses a woman's interest in obtaining an abortion. See, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) ; Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) . This right is not absolute, but is subject to the States' interests in preserving maternal health or the life of a viable fetus. Because of their emphasis on the liberty and privacy 4. Another line of equal protection cases decided by the Warren court involved challenges by individual voters to their States' reapportionment statutes. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) . The Burger Court repeatedly has reaffirmed the vitality of the principles announced there. E.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) . This term, the Court extended this line of decisions, squarely holding for the first time that a claim of partisan political gerrymandering is justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. Davis v. Bandemer, -U.S.
- (1986) . But there was no Court for the standard that should be used to assess the constitutionality of reapportionment law alleged to be an unlawful partisan gerrymander. A recent case tested the limits of substantive due process. In Bowers v.
Hardwick, __ U.S. __ (1986) , the Court declined to hold that substantive due process encompasses a right to engage in homosexual sodomy. Statutes similar to the Georgia law challenged in this case have been on the books for hundreds of years. These laws, now moribund and rarely enforced, still exist in about half of the states. The case may not be as significant as press reports suggest. The respondent had not been tried or convicted, and we had no occasion to consider possible defenses, such as one based on the Eighth Amendment, to an actual prosecution.
First Amendment
Although First Amendment partisans rarely seem satisfied, both the Warren and Burger Courts have been sensitive to the First Amendment rights that are fundamental to our democracy. Certainly, there has been no retreat by the Burger Court from the stringent enforcement of these important rights. 350 (1977) . This term, in a case involving casino advertising, the Court again reaffirmed that speech concerning commercial transactions is entitled to First Amendment protection. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., -U.S.
- (1986) . But we concluded that a State's interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens could support a decision to regulate commercial speech, as long as the restrictions advanced that interest and were no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.
The 
.
[Vol The Burger Court also has decided a number of cases presenting issues under the "religion clauses" of the First Amendment. I believe it is fair to say that no prior court has been more zealous to assure separation of church and state, and at the same time to protect the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. 7 Of course, our decisions in this area reflect the tensions inevitably created by the sometimes conflicting values embodied in the religion clauses.
Summary
The Burger Court decided well over 2,000 cases. The Warren Court, over 15 years, decided several hundred fewer cases. I cite these numbers to emphasize the high degree of selectivity in my discussion this afternoon. 
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WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW a sense of direction," appeared to "drift," or lacked a coherent "policy." 8 To lawyers, and certainly to Article III judges, these observations should make little sense. The great strength of the Supreme Court is that we have no "policy" or purpose other than "faithfully and impartially" to discharge our duties "agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States." 9 This is our sworn duty. As a New York Times editorial put it, "The ultimate glory of this unique institution is that each member [appointed for life] is master only of himself." New York Times, June 18, 1986. It is well to remember that the provisions of the Bill of Rights are expressed in general terms: the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments all are open to, and indeed require, interpretation. Inevitably and properly, reasonable minds-trained in the same law schools-often differ in interpreting these important provisions. Yet, the long-term stability of our legal system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis. Commentators who expect radical changes because of personnel changes on the Court seem to overlook our fidelity to this doctrine.
If I may speak personally, I knew most of the Justices on the Warren Court, and of course I am close to those on the Burger Court with whom I serve. I have great respect and admiration for the legal ability, devotion to duty, and integrity of each of them.
Although at age 64 I went on the Court with some reluctance, I am honored to serve on it. Under our remarkable constitutional system, the Court has well discharged its responsibility to safeguard the liberties of our people.
LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. August 12, 1986 8. This misconception of the role of the Supreme Court was strikingly illustrated by a widely circulated news story. The Court was criticized for giving "mixed signals" rather than providing "one guided ideology." Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 13, 1986.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (oath taken by federal Justices and judges).
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